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Abstract
Recent researches show that unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) can offer an efficient solution
to achieve wireless connectivity with high mobility and low cost. This paper investigates the
secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) in an UAV-enabled communication network via a threshold-
based access scheme and multi-antenna technique, where the UAV-enabled transmitters, legit-
imate receivers and eavesdroppers are deployed randomly. In particular, we first exploit the
association probability of a randomly located receiver and the activation probability of UAV-
enabled transmitters. Then, we analyze the security, reliability, and SEE of the UAV-enabled
networks. Simulation results are finally provided to show the effect of the predetermined access
threshold on the reliability as well as security performance, and determine the optimal design
parameters for a given UAV-enabled network to maximize the SEE.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is emerging as a novel paradigm in civil and
military applications, such as traffic monitoring, disaster rescue, and military reconnaissance [1].
In contrast to a terrestrial transmitter, UAV, as a mobile transmitter, can provide a promising
solution to complement the capacity and coverage of terrestrial cellular systems, especially
in extreme environments without infrastructure [2]. On the other hand, information security
is a critical issue facing national defense when people rely heavily on wireless network for
transmitting private information [3], [4]. Toward this, the use of UAV can offer new opportunities
for security enhancement via a cooperative air-ground network. However, the performance and
operation of a UAV-enabled communication network is constrained by the limited on-board
energy. Therefore, the joint performance analysis of security and energy efficiency for UAV-
enabled networks is urgently needed and is the emphasis of this work.
The notion of UAV in wireless communication systems has recently been pursued in different
contexts. In [2], the basic networking architecture and channel characteristics of UAV-enabled
wireless communications were portrayed. Owing to high mobility, UAVs could also be deployed
as mobile relays to provide wireless connectivity between distant ground terminals whose direct
links were severely blocked [5]. The authors of [6] proposed an algorithm that allocated the time
to different ground receivers based on the flying UAV’s position for maximizing the minimum
throughput. [7] modeled the locations of the UAV base stations (BSs) in a finite area as a
uniform binomial point process and derived exact expression for the coverage probability of a
target receiver situated on the ground. In addition, the co-existence between the UAV BSs and an
underlaid device-to-device communication network was considered in [8]. The aforementioned
works addressed the basic networking architecture and optimization problem of the throughput.
However, the information security against eavesdropping attacks was not taken into account.
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3A very recent effort [9] considered physical layer security in a UAV-enabled mobile relaying
system where the air-to-ground link was established. Note that the authors of [9] focused
on the optimization of transmit power, but not from the perspective of network analysis and
deployment. They considered neither the multi-UAV multi-eavesdropper wiretap scenario, nor
the random spatial positions of network nodes. To the best of our knowledge, such work has
not tried to design and analyze the secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) performance in UAV-enable
communication networks, which motivates this work.
In this paper, we focus on the SEE in downlink UAV-enabled communication networks. Main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. 1) Modeling multi-antenna UAV-enabled
transmitters, receivers, and eavesdroppers as independent homogeneous Poisson point processes
(HPPPs). By using the threshold-based access scheme, a fundamental analysis framework for
evaluating the SEE performance in UAV-enabled communication networks is proposed; 2) The
influences on connection outage probability (COP) and secrecy outage probability (SOP), caused
by the predetermined access threshold and the number of receivers served by each transmitter,
are further analyzed in this scenario.
Notations: Boldface lowercase paper denotes vector. (·)†, ‖ ·‖, P{·}, and E(·) denote the con-
jugate transpose, Euclidean norm, probability, and expectation operation. Γ(a, b) is the Gamma
distribution with shape parameter a and scale parameter b.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Descriptions
We consider a wireless system consisting of single-tier UAV-enabled transmitters, multiple
legitimate receivers, and multiple eavesdroppers, as shown in Fig. 1. Note that the UAVs are
assumed to be at the same height HT for simplicity of exposition. Each UAV-enabled transmitter
equipped with MT antennas can collect and transmit information to the ground receivers. The
number of receivers served in each transmitter’s resource block is ΨT , and the transmit power is
PT . The legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers are equipped with a single antenna. We denote the
set of UAVs, legitimate receivers, and eavesdroppers locations as ΦT , Φu, and ΦE , which follow
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4Fig. 1: A simplified system model of a UAV-enabled communication network.
independent HPPPs with densities λT , λu, and λE , respectively. According to Slivnyak’s theorem
[10], the analysis can be performed at a typical legitimate receiver located at the origin. Compared
with interference, noise almost has no effect for legitimate receivers in random wireless networks
[10]. Hence, we assume that the noises received by legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers are
neglected.
One common approach to modeling air-to-ground propagation channel is to consider line-of-
sight (LoS) and non-line-of-sight (NLoS) components along with their occurrence probabilities
separately as shown in [8]. Considering the free space propagation loss, different excessive path
loss values are assigned to LoS and NLoS links in this work. Depending on the LoS or NLoS
connection between the legitimate/illegitimate receiver x and UAV y, the received signal power
at x location is given by
Px,yhx,y
‖x− y‖α =

 PThx,y‖x− y‖
−α, LoS,
ηPThx,y‖x− y‖−α, NLoS,
(1)
where ‖x− y‖ is the distance between x and y, η is an additional attenuation factor due to the
NLoS connection [8], hx,y is the array gain of channel between x and its corresponding UAV
BS y, and α is the path loss exponent over the receiver-UAV link. As considered in [8], the
probability of LoS connection depends on the environment, the location of the receiver x and
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5the transmitter y, the elevation angle between x and y, and the density and height of buildings.
The LoS probability can be expressed as follows [8]
PL(‖x− y‖) = [1 + C exp(−B[θ − C])]−1, (2)
where C and B are constant values which depend on the environment and θ = 180pi sin(HT /‖x−y‖)
is the elevation angle. Furthermore, probability of NLoS is PN(‖x− y‖) = 1− PL(‖x− y‖).
In this work, the system model has other three restraints:
• All the channels undergo independent and identically distributed quasi-static Rayleigh fading
[8];
• Perfect channel state information (CSI) is available at each UAV-enabled transmitter;
• All the transmitters use precoding w = h†/‖h‖, where h is the corresponding channel.
In UAV-enabled communication networks, the received signal-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) of the typical receiver o served by the UAV-enabled transmitter xs ∈ ΦT is given by
SINRu = Po,xsho,xs l
−α
o,xs/I
inter
o , (3)
where Po,xsho,xs l
−α
o,xs denotes the received power of the typical receiver, lo,xs =
√
H2T + r
2
o,xs
denotes the distance between the serving transmitter xs and o, ro,xs denotes the distance between
xs and o
′ (the origin of the plane of ΦT ), ho,xs ∼ Γ(∆T , 1) stands for the array gain of the main
channel, ∆T = MT − ΨT + 1, and l−αo,xs is the path loss [11]. I intero =
∑
z∈ΦoT \xs
Po,zgo,zl
−α
o,z
represents receiver’s received interference from all the active transmitters except the serving
transmitter (i.e., I intero denotes the inter-cell interference of receiver), where lo,z =
√
H2T + r
2
o,z
denotes the distance between the transmitter z and o, ro,z denotes the distance between z and o
′,
and go,z ∼ Γ(ΨT , 1) is the array gain of corresponding interference channel. The set of active
transmitters is a thinning of ΦT , denoted by Φ
o
T with density λ
o
T = PactλT , where Pact denotes
the activation probability of transmitters.
We consider the non-colluding and passive eavesdropping scenario that each eavesdropper
intercepts the information signal of typical receiver independently without any attacks. In this
case, we only pay our attention to the eavesdropper that has the largest received SINR, which
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6was commonly assumed [11]. Such an eavesdropper e is considered as the most malicious one
and its received SINR can be expressed as
SINRe = max
xe∈ΦE
{
Pxe,xshxe,xsl
−α
xe,xs
I intraxe + I
inter
xe
}
, (4)
where hxe,xs ∼ exp(1) denotes the equivalent small-scale fading channel power gain for the
received SINR of eavesdropper xe ∈ ΦE , lxe,xs =
√
H2T + r
2
xe,xs indicates the distance between
the eavesdropper xe and its target transmitter xs, and rxe,xs is the eavesdropper’s horizontal
distance from xs. I
intra
xe = Pxe,xsgxe,xsl
−α
xe,xs with gxe,xs ∼ Γ (ΨT − 1, 1) is the eavesdropper’s
received interference from the target transmitter (i.e., eavesdropper’s intra-cell interference)
and I interxe =
∑
z∈ΦoT\xs
Pxe,zgxe,zl
−α
xe,z with gxe,z ∼ Γ (ΨT , 1) is the eavesdropper’s inter-
cell interference [11]. lxe,z =
√
H2T + r
2
xe,z is the distance between the eavesdropper xe and
transmitter z, and rxe,z is the eavesdropper’s horizontal distance from z.
B. Secrecy Mobile Association Scheme
In this subsection, we assume open access, i.e., a legitimate receiver is permitted to access
any UAV-enabled transmitters. In addition, we consider a mobile association based on highest
average received signal power (ARSP), where a legitimate receiver is only allowed to associate
with the UAV-enabled transmitter providing the highest ARSP. For a legitimate receivers o, the
ARSP related to xs is defined as P¯T = Po,xs∆T l
−α
o,xs .
Following the idea of [12], the secure mobile association scheme is designed for improving
the security/reliability of downlink transmission in UAV-enabled communication networks. For
the secure mobile association scheme, the served transmitter broadcasts data only when the
truncated ARSP at receiver is larger than a predetermined access threshold τ , i.e.,
lo,xs ≤ RT =

 RL = (PT∆T /τ)
1/α, LoS,
RN = (ηPT∆T /τ)
1/α, NLoS,
(5)
where RT denotes the radius of the serving region. The following lemma provides the association
probability.
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7Lemma 1: The probability with which a typical legitimate receiver o associates with a trans-
mitter xs is given as
ST = exp
[
−(piλT )2
[∫ R2L
H2T
PL(
√
z)B1(z, zη
2/α)dz
+
∫ R2N
H2T
PN(
√
z)B1(zη
−2/α, z)dz
]]
,
(6)
where B1(a, b) =
∫∞
a PL(
√
y)× e−piλT (y−H2T )dy + ∫∞b PN(√y)× e−piλT (y−H2T )dy 1.
Proof : The expression of ST can be obtained as
ST = P [No BS closer than xs and the ARSP of receiver is larger than τ ]
= E
[∏
z∈ΦT\xs
P
[
Po,xs l
α
o,z
Po,zlαo,xs
> 1
]]
(a)
= exp
[
−2piλT
∫ rT
0 P
[
rxs >
√(
Po,xs
Po,z
)2/α (
x2 +H2T
)−H2T
]
xdx
]
(b)
= exp
[
−(piλT )2
[∫ R2L
H2T
PL(
√
z)
[∫∞
z PL(
√
y)e−piλT (y−H
2
T )dy +
∫∞
zη2/α PN(
√
y)e−piλT (y−H
2
T )dy
]
dz
+
∫ R2N
H2T
PN(
√
z)
[∫∞
zη−2/α PL(
√
y)e−piλT (y−H
2
T )dy +
∫∞
z PN(
√
y)e−piλT (y−H
2
T )dy
]
dz
]]
,
(7)
where the step (a) can be easily recognized by the probability generating functional of HPPP
[12] and rT =
√
R2T −H2T . The step (b) is derived by frxs (x) = 2piλTxe−piλTx
2
, where rxs is
the receiver’s horizontal distance from transmitter xs. Substituting B1(a, b) into (7), we complete
the proof.
It is worth noting that a transmitter may be active when existing an associated receiver, and
the activation probability of transmitter xs can be defined as [12]
Pact = P (xs associates with at least one receiver)
= 1− E
[ ∏
xu∈Φu
P(xu is not associated with xs)
]
.
(8)
From (3) and (4), we know that the derivation for activation probability of transmitter is necessary,
which is given in Lemma 2.
1For convenience, we interchangeably use exp(x) and ex to denote the exponential function of x.
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8Lemma 2: The activation probability of UAV-enabled transmitters is given by
Pact = 1− exp
[
−2piλu
∑
j=L,N
∫√R2j−H2T
0 exp
[
−(piλT )2
(∫ R2L
H2T
PL(
√
z)B1(z, zη
2/α)dz
+
∫ R2N
H2T
PN(
√
z)B1(zη
−2/α, z)dz
)]
Pj(x)xdx
]
.
(9)
Proof : The derivations of Pact can be given as
Pact = 1− E
[ ∏
xu∈Φu
(
1− E
[∏
z∈ΦT\xs
P
[
Pxu,xs l
α
xu,z
Pxu,zl
α
xu,xs
> 1
]])]
(c)
= 1− exp
[
−2piλu
∑
j=L,N
∫√R2j−H2T
0 STPj(x)xdx
]
,
(10)
where the step (c) is derived following the basic nature of PPP, lxu,z = ‖xu − z‖, and lxu,xs =
‖xu − xs‖. Substituting ST into (10), we complete the proof.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the SEE in UAV-enabled communication networks. In an effort to
assess the SEE, we first derive the COP and the SOP in UAV-enabled networks.
When the legitimate receiver’s message cannot be decoded with error-free, the connection
outage occurs. The expression of COP is given in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: When the typical receiver is associated with a UAV-enabled transmitter, its COP
can be expressed as
Pcop (γT ) = STP (SINRu < 2
γT − 1)
= STFSINRu (2
γT − 1) ,
(11)
where γT is the target channel capacity. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of SINRu
can be given by
FSINRu(γ) = P
(
ho,xs < γI
inter
o l
−α
o,xs/Po,xs
)
= 1− ∑
i=L,N
∫√R2i−H2T
0
∆T−1∑
n=0
∑
m¯∈M(n)
f
∑
m¯(g(si))
×C(m¯)
n∏
l=1
(
g(l) (si)
)ml (−si)n
n! Pi (lo,xs)fro,xs (y)dy,
(12)
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9where M(n) = {m¯ = (m1,m2, · · · ,mn) :
∑n
j=1 jmj = n}, fro,xs (y) = 2piλT yST e−piλT y
2
[12],
sL = γP
−1
T
(
H2T + y
2
)α/2
, sN = γη
−1P−1T
(
H2T + y
2
)α/2
, C (m¯) = n!∏
j (mj !(j!)
mj ) , lz(a) =√
(a/Po,xs)
1/α (H2T + y2), B2(a) = −1 + (1 + asiz−α)ΨT ,
f (g (si)) = exp
[∫∞
lz(Po,z)
2piλoTB2 (Po,z) zdz
]
= exp
[∫∞
lz(PT )
2piλoTPL (z)B2 (PT ) zdz
+
∫∞
lz(ηPT )
2piλoTPN (z)B2 (ηPT ) zdz
]
,
(13)
and
g(l) (si) =
2piλoT (ΨT+l−1)!
(ΨT−1)!(−Po,z)
−l
∫∞
lz(Po,z)
z1−lα
(1+siPo,zz−α)
ΨT+l
dz
= 2piλ
o
T (ΨT+l−1)!
(ΨT−1)!(−PT )
−l
∫∞
lz(PT )
z1−lαPL(z)
(1+siPT z−α)
ΨT+l
dz
+ 2piλ
o
T (ΨT+l−1)!
(ΨT−1)!(−ηPT )
−l
∫∞
lz(ηPT )
z1−lαPN(z)
(1+siηPT z−α)
ΨT+l
dz.
(14)
Proof : The CDF of SINRu can be obtained as
FSINRu(γ) = 1−
∫√R2T−H2T
0 Fˆ (Po,xs) fro,xs (y) dy
= 1− ∫√R2L−H2T0 Fˆ (PT ) fro,xs (y)PL (lo,xs) dy
− ∫√R2N−H2T0 Fˆ (ηPT ) fro,xs (y)PN (lo,xs) dy
= 1− ∑
i=L,N
∫√R2i−H2T
0
∆T−1∑
n=0
dnLIintero
(si)
d(si)
n
(−si)
n
n!
×fro,xs (y)Pi (lo,xs) dy,
(15)
where
dnLIintero
(si)
d(si)
n =
∑
m¯∈M(n)
[f
∑
m¯ (g (si))
n∏
l=1
(
g(l) (si)
)ml × C (m¯)] is derived by using Faa`
di Bruno’s lemma [12], LI intero (si) = f (g (si)) is obtained by the basic nature of PPP, and
Fˆ (a) = P(ho,xs > γI
inter
o l
α
o,xs/a|ro,xs). f (g (si)) and g(l) (si) are derived in (13) and (14),
respectively. Substituting (15) into (11), we complete the proof.
As such, when the eavesdroppers have a better channel than the access threshold, the secrecy
outage occurs to ensure the secrecy of those messages. As an important indicator of security,
the expression of SOP is given in Theorem 2.
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Theorem 2. When the typical receiver is associated with a UAV-enabled transmitter, its SOP
can be given by
Psop(Rˆs) = STP(log2(1 + SINRe) > γT − Rˆs)
= ST (1− FSINRe(2γT−Rˆs − 1)),
(16)
where Rˆs is the target secrecy rate of Psop(Rˆs) and the CDF of SINRe can be expressed as
FSINRe(γ) = exp
[
−2piλE
∫∞
HT
y
(γ+1)(ΨT−1)
× ∑
i=L,N
Pi(y)
(
e
−2piλoT
∫
∞
HT
(1−(1+s′iPT z−α)−ΨT )PL(z)zdz
× e−2piλoT
∫
∞
HT
(1−(1+s′iηPT z−α)−ΨT )PN(z)zdz
)
dy
]
.
(17)
Proof : The CDF of SINRe can be derived as follows:
FSINRe(γ) = E
[ ∏
xe∈ΦE
P
[
hxe,xs ≤
γ(I intraxe +I
inter
xe )
Pxe,xs l
−α
xe,xs
]]
(d)
= e
−2piλE
∫
∞
HT
∑
i=L,N LIintraxe
(s′i)LIinterxe
(s′i)yPi(y)dy ,
(18)
where the step (d) is achieved by the probability generating functional of HPPP ΦE [12],
s′L = γP
−1
T y
α, and s′N = γη
−1P−1T y
α. The Laplace transform of I intraxe and I
inter
xe are given by
LI intraxe (s
′
i) = (γ + 1)
−(ΨT−1) and LI interxe (s
′
i) = exp[−2piλoT
∫∞
HT
[(1− (1 + s′iPT z−α)−ΨT )PL(z)+
(1 − (1 + s′iηPT z−α)−ΨT )PN(z)]zdz], respectively. Substituting (18) into (16), we can arrive
at the final result.
Due to the requirement of secure communication and the limitation of energy, SEE as an
important metric is used to evaluate the secrecy performance achieved with unit energy con-
sumption. Similar to [13], SEE is defined as the ratio of the average secrecy rate at which the
confidential messages are reliably and securely transmitted from the UAV-enabled transmitters
to the intended receivers over the total power consumption (bits/Joule). The following theorem
provides the SEE achieved by the UAV-enabled communication network.
Theorem 3. The SEE of the UAV-enabled communication networks is given by
SEE = STΨT (1− Pcop(γT ))(1 − Psop(Rˆs))Rˆs/P totalT , (19)
where P totalT = P
0
T +
PT
εT
+
∑3
t=1(Ψ
t−1
T (∆˜t +MTΛt)) denotes the total power consumption for
a UAV-enabled transmitter in each channel [13]. P 0T and εT represent the static hardware power
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consumption and the efficiency of the power amplifier, respectively. The parameters ∆˜t and Λt
depends on the transceiver chains, coding and decoding, etc.
Proof : In existing literature, [14] investigated the SEE of single-antenna cognitive radio
network (CRN) with secure mobile association scheme, and [13] invoked the SEE of multi-
antenna CRN. Depending on the expression of SEE in [14] and [13], the SEE in this work can
be given as
SEE = ΨTST (1− Ptsop(γT , Rˆs))Rˆs/P totalT , (20)
where Ptsop(γT , Rˆs) is the transmission secrecy outage probability (TSOP). The TSOP char-
acterizes the probability that either connection outage or secrecy outage occurs [14], which is
derived by
Ptsop(γT , Rˆs)
= 1− P(SINRu > 2γT − 1,SINRe < 2γT−Rˆs − 1)
= 1− (1− Pcop(γT ))(1− Psop(Rˆs)).
(21)
Substituting (21) into (20), we can arrive at the final result.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are provided to examine the COP and SOP for a single-tier
UAV-enabled network. In addition, the impact of τ and PT on the SEE are also investigated.
The validity of the theoretical derivations are verified by the Monte Carlo simulation results. In
the following results, we assume α = 3, λT = 6× 10−7m2, λu = 10−6m2, λE = 6× 10−7m2,
HT = 500m, εT = 0.38, ∆˜1 = 4.8, ∆˜2 = 0, ∆˜3 = 2.08ΨT × 10−8, Λ1 = 1, Λ2 = 9.5 × 10−8,
Λ3 = 6.25 × 10−8, P 0T = 4W, γT = 1, Rˆs = 0.6, and η = 20dB. B = 0.136 and C = 11.95
are parameters for dense urban environment [8]. All the simulation results shown in this section
are averaged over 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations.
Fig. 2 compares the SOP and COP in UAV-enabled networks with different ΨT . Intuitively,
the simulation results highly consistent with the theoretical results, which validates the accuracy
of those two analytical expressions derived. It is also observed that the COP increases with ΨT
May 18, 2017 DRAFT
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Fig. 2: The COP and SOP versus τ with PT = 5dB. S denotes the simulation results and T
denotes the theoretical results.
and the SOP decreases with ΨT , which is mainly due to the fact that ΨT not only increases the
interference received by eavesdroppers, but also increases the interference received by legitimate
receivers. Furthermore, the COP and SOP performances over different τ are also shown in Fig. 2.
Obviously, both SOP and COP degrades with increasing τ . This implies that the predetermined
access threshold can affect both security and reliability. This is due to both the association
probability in (6) and the activation probability of UAV-enabled transmitter in (9) degrades with
increasing τ .
Fig. 3 shows the influences on SEE caused by τ and PT . From (19), we note that the SEE
is not a monotonous function of τ and PT . Consequently, the optimal value of SEE can be
obtained by properly designing τ and PT . In Fig. 3, the SEE reveals a maximum value for a
given network with the optimal pair of (τ, PT ) = (−87, 1), which is marked in the figure.
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Fig. 3: SEE versus τ and PT , with ΨT = 1 and ∆T = 4.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the SEE of downlink UAV-enabled networks, where the locations of
network nodes were characterized by independent HPPPs. To ensure the reliability and security
of UAV-enabled networks, both the threshold-based access scheme and multi-antenna technology
were employed. The security, reliability, and SEE of UAV-enabled networks was analyzed.
Simulation results have revealed that the reliability and security of UAV-enabled networks could
be improved by using the threshold-based access scheme, and the optimal value of SEE could
be achieved by designing the transmit powers and predetermined access threshold.
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